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INTRODUCTION

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")' is a federal statute
that provides money to state and local education agencies to help them provide
education to children with disabilities. The IDEA requires that states that receive
federal money provide a "free appropriate public education to all children with
disabilities."2 The IDEA also requires that states establish procedural safeguards
for disabled students and their parents.3 Those procedural safeguards include the
right to a due process hearing before a state education agency if the school alters a
student's educational program in ways with which the student's parents disagree. 4
Parents or schools who are aggrieved by the outcome of the due process hearing
may bring a civil action in either state or federal court.5 Parents who prevail in a

* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1995,
Purdue University. I dedicate this Note to my wife, Stacey, who encouraged me to go to law
school and tolerated me while I did.
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000).
2. Id. § 1412(a)(l)(A).
3. Id. § 1415(a).

4. Id. § 1415(0(1).
5. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
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dispute with a school may bring an action for attorneys' fees; 6 however, schools
may not, even if they prevail. 7
Neither § 1415(i)(2)(A), providing for judicial review of administrative
decisions, nor § 1415(i)(3)(B), providing for attorneys' fees, includes a statute of
limitations. In the absence of congressional direction, state and federal courts have
adopted a variety of limitations periods to govern the causes of action created by
the IDEA.8 Although there is disagreement among jurisdictions concerning the
proper limitations period for both § 1415(i)(2)(A) actions ("administrative review
actions") and § 1415(i)(3)(B) actions ("attorneys' fees actions"), there is certainty
within most jurisdictions concerning what the proper limitations period is for
administrative review actions. 9 However, there is still considerable uncertainty
within many jurisdictions regarding the proper limitations period for attorneys' fees
actions.1 0
This Note considers what should be the statute of limitations for attorneys'
fees actions brought under the IDEA. Part I reviews the history and purpose of the
IDEA, focusing on how the IDEA seeks to protect the rights of disabled students
and their parents. Part II describes how courts determine an appropriate statute of
limitations for a federal cause of action where Congress has not specified a
limitations period. Part III examines which limitations periods courts have adopted
for administrative review actions. Part IV considers which limitations period is
appropriate for attorneys' fees actions.
This Note concludes that the proper limitations period for attorneys' fees
actions is provided by state statutes of limitations for actions founded on statutory
liability," because an action for attorneys' fees is more analogous to an action
provided by statute than to any other state cause of action. Further, the relatively
lengthy limitations periods provided by those statutes are consistent with the
purposes and operation of the IDEA.
Questions about limitations periods involve technical procedural issues.
Uncertainty about limitations periods, however, creates substantive problems for

6. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
7. Id.; Zipperer v. Sch. Bd., 111 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Curtis K. v.
Sioux City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1197, 1210 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (noting that
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) "provides for a cause of action for attorney fees, not by 'any aggrieved
party,' but by a 'prevailing party"').
8. See STUDENTS wrTH DIsABLEs AND SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 165-76 (Patricia
Grzywacz Walsh et al. eds., 19th ed. 2002); Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Statutes of Limitationsfor
Filing a Lawsuit Under the Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Act, 106 EDUC. L. REP.
959, 961-67 (1996); Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, What Statute of LimitationsApplies
to Civil Actions Brought in Federal Court Under Education of the HandicappedAct (20
U.S.C.S. §§ 1400 et seq.) to Challenge Findings and Decisions of State Administrative
Agencies, 107 A.L.R. FED. 758 (1992).
9. See Dougherty, supra note 8.

10. To date, only the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits have considered the proper limitations period for actions for attorneys'
fees. See King v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 228 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2000); Zipperer, 111
F.3d at 851; Rosemary B. v. Bd. of Educ., 52 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1995); Reed v. Mokena Sch.
Dist. No. 159, 41 F.3d 1153 (7th Cir. 1994); Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir.

1994).
11. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(a) (West 2003) (three years);
95.11(3)(f) (2002) (four years); IND. CODE § 34-11-2-4 (1998) (two years).

FLA. STAT.

ch.
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parents who seek to vindicate their children's rights,' 2 attorneys who work to
promote the rights of disabled children, 3 and schools that must balance their
budgets between the demands of education and litigation. 14 Determining which
limitations period should apply to attorneys' fees actions requires an examination
of both the structure and the goals of the IDEA.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE IDEA
In 1970 Congress originally enacted the IDEA as the Education of the
Handicapped Act ("EHA"). 5 Congress amended the EHA in 1975 by passing the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 ("EAHCA").16 The EAHCA7
included many procedural safeguards for handicapped children and their parents.1
Congress added more procedural safeguards in the Handicapped Children's
Protection Act of 1986 ("HCPA").'5 Among those safeguards was a section
authorizing an award of attorneys' fees to parents of disabled children who
prevailed in disputes with schools.19 In 1990, Congress officially renamed the EHA
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.20
One of the purposes of the IDEA is to help state and local education agencies
provide disabled students with an education that will prepare them for employment
and independent living. 21 The IDEA also seeks to protect the rights of disabled
children and their parents.22 Congress enacted the IDEA because it found that some
public education, while other disabled
disabled children did not receive an adequate 23
children did not receive any public education.
While considering the most recent amendments to the IDEA,24 Congress
reported the success of its programs: "The number of children with developmental
disabilities in State institutions has declined by close to 90 percent. The number of
young adults with disabilities enrolled in postsecondary education has tripled, and
the unemployment rate for individuals with disabilities in their twenties is almost

12. See Curtis K., 895 F. Supp. at 1201.
13. When Congress enacted the attorneys' fees provision of the IDEA, it recognized
and approved of the fact that some awards of attorneys' fees would go to public interest
lawyers. See S. REP. No. 99-112, at 17 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1806.
14. See Allan G. Osboume, Jr. & Philip DiMattia, Commentary, Attorneys Fees Are
Available for Administrative Proceedings Under the EHA, 66 EDuc. L. REP. 909, 918
(1991).
15. Pub. L. No. 91-230, Title VI, 84 Stat. 175 (1970). For a brief history of the IDEA,
see STUDENTS WITH DIsABuTIES AND SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW, supra note 8, at 2. See also
Curtis K., 895 F. Supp. at 1205 n.3.
16. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774 (1975).
17. STUDENTS WITH DIsABmLrmS AND SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW, supra note 8, at 2.
18. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986).
19. STUDENTS wrrH DISABILrEs AND SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW, supra note 8, at 2.
20. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476,
§ 901(a), 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42. This Note will refer to all legislation now codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 as "the IDEA" unless referring specifically to one of the amendments
described above.
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000).
22. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(B).
23. Id. § 1400(c)(2).
24. Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (most recent substantive
amendments).
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half that of their older counterparts."
The IDEA has helped disabled children, their parents, and schools to achieve
those results by providing money to states "to assist them to provide special
education and related services to children with disabilities." 26 States that receive
money under the IDEA must provide a free appropriate public education ("FAPE")
to all disabled children between the ages of three and twenty-one with who reside
in the state. 7 Schools must prepare an individualized education program ("IEP")
for each child with a disability. 28 The IEP must include a statement of how the
child's disability affects the child's educational progress and a statement of goals
for the child's education. 29 The statement of goals must include a statement of what
special services and aids the child will need, a statement of how the child will be
integrated into regular classroom and extracurricular activities with nondisabled
children, and an explanation of the circumstances, if any, in which a child will not
participate in the regular curriculum with nondisabled children. 30 The team that
creates the IEP must include the parents of the disabled child, at least one of the
child's regular education teachers (if it is possible for the child to participate in
regular education), at least one of the child's special education teachers, a
representative of the local education agency, and, if possible, the disabled child.3'
Each child's LEP must be reviewed at least once per year.32
In addition to the substantive requirements described above, the IDEA also
requires states to maintain procedural safeguards to protect the rights of disabled
students and their parents. Parents must be afforded "an opportunity to present
complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public
education to such child., 3 3 Parents who file a complaint under § 1415(b)(6) have a
right to an impartial due process hearing. 34 The hearing may be conducted either by
a state agency or by a local education agency. 35 If a local agency conducts the
initial due process hearing, then the party aggrieved by the agency's decision may
appeal to the state agency for review.36 Any party aggrieved by the decision of the
state education agency may bring a civil action in state or federal court.37 The
IDEA directs the court to review the administrative record and permits the court to

25. H.R. RFP. No. 105-95, at 84 (1997), reprintedin 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 81.
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (a)(1).
27. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(A).
28. Id. § 1412(a)(4).
29. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
32. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i).
33. Id. § 1415(b)(6).
34. Id. § 1415(f)(1).
35. Id. The decision as to whether the initial due process hearing will be held at the
local or state level may be determined either by state law or by the state department of
education. Id.
36. Id. § 1415(g). In states that provide for due process hearings at both the local and
state levels, the local agency hearing is called a "Level I hearing" and the state agency
hearing is called a "Level II hearing." See McCartney C. v. Herrin Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.
4, 21 F.3d 173, 174 (7th Cir. 1994).
37.20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
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hear additional evidence. 38 The court must make its decision based on the
a statute of limitations
preponderance of the evidence. 39 The
0 IDEA does not specify
for bringing a civil action in court
Although the EAHCA authorized parents to seek administrative and judicial
review of certain decisions made by schools, the Supreme Court held in Smith v.
Robinson that parents who prevailed in litigation with schools could not receive
attorneys' fees.' Congress responded to Smith by enacting the Handicapped
Children's Protection Act of 1986.42 Congress was concerned that if parents were
unable to receive attorneys' fees, many would be unable to vindicate the rights that
the IDEA guaranteed to their children. Senator Weicker remarked:
What we do here today is to make the Education of Handicapped Act
consistent with more than 130 other fee shifting statutes which provide
for the award of attorneys' fees to parties who prevail in court to obtain
what is guaranteed to them by law. Without this remedy, many of our
civil rights would be hollow pronouncements available
43 only to those
who could afford to sue for enforcement of their rights.
The current version of the attorneys' fees provision provides: "[i]n any action
or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award
reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a
disability who is the prevailing party."" The reasonableness of attorneys' fees is
determined by the prevailing rate in the community in which the action was
brought for the type of services the attorney provided. 5 The court may reduce an
award of attorneys' fees if the parents unreasonably protracted the dispute, or if the
parents' attorney failed to provide all required information in the due process
complaint. 46

38. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(ii).
39. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii).
40. The IDEA also fails to provide a limitations period for seeking administrative
review of a school's educational decisions. See C.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 241 F.3d 374, 379 (4th
Cir. 2001). The regulations implementing the IDEA do require that a state education agency
convene a hearing within forty-five days of receiving a request for a hearing and that a state
education agency complete a review of the hearing within thirty days of receiving a request
for review. 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (2003). Both the school district and the parents may request
additional time to prepare for a hearing. ld.
41. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
42. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986).
43. 132 CONG. REc. 16,823 (statement of Sen. Weicker); see also Fontenot v. La. Bd.

of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 805 F.2d 1222, 1223 (5th Cir. 1986) (characterizing
Congress as acting "swiftly, decisively, and with uncharacteristic clarity to correct what it
viewed as a judicial misinterpretation of its intent").
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
45. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(C).

46. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F). Section 1415(b)(7)(B) requires parents or their attorney to
provide the child's school with the following information:
(i) the name of the child, the address of the residence of the child, and
the name of the school the child is attending;
(ii) a description of the nature of the problem of the child relating to
such proposed initiation or change, including facts relating to such
problem; and

INDIANA L4W JOURNAL

[Vol.79:493

Courts determine whether a parent is a "prevailing party" by applying the test
the Supreme Court formulated in Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland

Independent School District47 In that case, the Court stated, "plaintiffs may be
considered 'prevailing parties' for attorney's fees purposes if they succeed on any
significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought
48
in bringing the suit."

Awards of attorneys' fees are not limited to cases resolved by judicial
review. 49 Since § 1415(i)(3)(B) refers to "any action or proceeding brought under
this section," 50 courts have allowed parents to recover attorneys' fees incurred
during administrative hearings. 5 1 Courts have also permitted parents to recover
attorneys' fees incurred during negotiations with schools concerning their child's
placement, even where those negotiations were successfully resolved prior to an
administrative hearing. 52 Thus, parents may recover any attorneys' fees they incur
while making a successful challenge to a school's educational program for their
child.
Just as the IDEA does not contain a statute of limitations for actions to review
the decisions of state education agencies, so too the IDEA does not contain a
statute of limitations for attorneys' fees actions. Therefore, this Note next discusses
how courts determine an appropriate limitations period when none is specified by
statute.
II. LIMITATIONS BORROWING WHERE FEDERAL STATUTES ARE SILENT

The problem of causes of action without express limitations periods is unique
to federal law.53 All states have enacted residual statutes of limitations that provide
a limitations period for causes of action for which there is no ex ress limitations
period. 54 Although there is a residual federal statute of limitations, it applies only

(iii) a proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and
available to the parents at the time ....
47. 489 U.S. 782, 789-90 (1989). For an application of the "prevailing party" test, see
J.H.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 705 A.2d 766, 773-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
48. Texas State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 789 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The court in Curtis K supported its validation of the Texas State
Teachers Ass'n prevailing party test with the IDEA's legislative history. 895 F. Supp. at
1208 n.6. The Supreme Court adopted a test in Texas State Teachers Ass'n that it had
developed in Hensley. A Senate report that discussed the attorneys' fee provision stated that
"prevailing party" should be interpreted "consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Hensley v. Eckerhart.....
S. REP. No. 99-112, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798, 1803.
49. See generally Osbourne, Jr. & DiMattia, supra note 14 (describing the history of the
attorneys' fees provision and reviewing cases that define the scope of the provision).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
51. Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Duane M. v.
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 861 F.2d 115, 120 (5th Cir. 1988); Eggers v. Bullitt County Sch.
Dist., 854 F.2d 892, 898 (6th Cir. 1988).
52. Shelly C. v. Venus Indep. Sch. Dist., 878 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 1989).
53. See Note, Limitation Borrowing in FederalCourts, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1127 (1979).
54. Id; e.g., IND. CODE § 34-11-1-2 (1998) (ten years); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213 (McKinney
2003) (six years); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1997) (four years).
55. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(a) (West Supp. 2003).
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to statutes enacted after December 1, 1990.56 Hence, there are still many federal
causes of action without an express statute of limitations.
A. The Importance of Certainty in Limitations Periods
Courts have recognized that certainty is especially important in determining
statutes of limitations. Since a statute of limitations period can bar a claim, even if
valid, potential litigants need to know with certainty how long they have to press a
claim or worry about defending against a claim. Uncertainty may cause a potential
plaintiff to lose his claim by not pressing it in time.
Further, uncertainty concerning what limitations period applies to a cause of
action may spawn substantial litigation over what limitations period should apply.
That satellite litigation interferes with the goals of the substantive legislation. As
the Supreme Court noted, "the legislative purpose to create an effective remedy for
the enforcement of federal civil rights is obstructed by uncertainty in the applicable
for scarce resources must be dissipated by useless litigation
statute of limitations, 58
on collateral matters."
Despite the need for definite limitations periods, many federal statutes fail to
specify a statute of limitations for the causes of action they create.5 9 Indeed, there
by federal
are over two hundred express and implied causes of action created
6
statutes for which there are no limitations periods provided by statute. 0
B. A PartialResidual Statute of Limitations
In 1990 Congress enacted a residual statute of limitations for statutes passed
after December 1, 1990.61 That statute provides, "Except as otherwise provided by
law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the
enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause
of action accrues." 62 Section 1658 does not, however, provide a statute of
limitations for statutes enacted before December 1, 1990, and therefore does not
apply to the IDEA.
Many commentators have criticized Congress for not making § 1658
63
retroactive. A House report explained the reason for not making § 1658
retroactive as follows:

56. Id.
57. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266 (1985) (stating that "'[flew areas of
the law stand in greater need of firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of
periods of limitations"' (quoting Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 667 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting))).
58. Id. at 275.
59. Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980) (describing a lack of a statute
of limitations as "a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law").
60. Abner J. Mikva & James E. Pfander, On the Meaning of Congressional Silence:
Using Federal Common Law to Fill the Gap in Congress's Residual Statute of Limitations,
107 YALE L.J. 393, 395 (1997).

61. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(a).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Kimberly Jade Norwood, 28 U.S.C. § 1658: A Limitation Periodwith Real
Limitations,69 IND. L.J. 477 (1994).
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[W]ith respect to many statutes that have no explicit limitations
provision, the relevant limitations period has long since been resolved
by judicial decision, with the applicable period decided upon by the
courts varying dramatically from statute to statute. Under these
circumstances, retroactively imposing a four year statute of limitations
on legislation that the courts have previously ruled is subject to a six
month limitation period in one statute, and a ten year period in another,
would threaten to disrupt the settled expectations of a great many
parties. Given that settling the expectations of prospective parties is an
essential purpose of statutes of limitation, the Committee was reluctant
to apply this section retroactively without further study to ensure that
64
the benefit of retroactive application would indeed outweigh the costs.
Whatever the merits of the argument that making § 1658 retroactive would
disrupt settled expectations for certain statutes, there could not have been any
settled expectations with regard to the IDEA's attorneys' fee provision in 1990. In
1990, no United States court of appeals had considered the question of limitations
periods for attorneys' fees actions, and only three district courts had considered the
question. 65
C. A JudicialSolution to a Legislative Problem
Judges find it difficult to impose limitations periods where Congress has not
because most judges believe that the creation of limitations periods is a legislative,
rather than a judicial, function.66 Most judges also believe, however, that allowing a
cause of action to live on indefinitely is worse than judicially imposing a
limitations period. 67 In a case from the early nineteenth century, Chief Justice
Marshall stated that causes of action without limitations periods "would be utterly
repugnant to the genius of our laws. In a country where not even treason can be
prosecuted after a lapse of three years, it could scarcely be supposed that an
individual would remain for ever [sic] liable to a pecuniary forfeiture. 68
Judges typically impose statutes of limitations by adopting the statute of
limitations from the cause of action under state law that is the most closely
analogous to the federal cause of action. 69 So if a district court in the Northern
District of Indiana wanted to know what statute of limitations should apply to
attorneys' fees actions under the IDEA, the court would examine Indiana statutes,

64. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 24 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6870.
65. The first appellate court decision concerning limitations periods for attorneys' fees
was Dell v. Board of Education, 32 F.3d 1053, 1064 (7th Cir. 1994) (adopting the Illinois
School Code's 120-day limitations period for judicial review of administrative decisions).
The three district court opinions to address the question before 1990 were James v. Nashua
School District,720 F. Supp. 1053, 1058 (D.N.H. 1989) (adopting New Hampshire's threeyear limitations period for personal injury actions), Michael M. v. Board of Education, 686
F. Supp. 995, 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (adopting New York's three-year limitations period for
"an action to recover upon a liability created or imposed by statute"), and Robert D. v. Sobel,
688 F. Supp. 861, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (adopting same limitations period as Michael M.).
66. See Dell, 32 F.3d at 1062; Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 84
(2d. Cir. 1961); Note, supra note 53, at 1131.
67. Note, supra note 53, at 1130.
68. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805).
69. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995).
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find in those statutes the cause of action most analogous to the IDEA attorneys'
fees action, and apply the limitations period from the state statute to the IDEA.7 °
A court first borrowed a state limitations period for a federal cause of action in
1895.71 The Court in Campbell held that the Rules of Decision Act72 required it to
adopt a limitations period from state law. 73 The Court recognized two exceptions to
the rule of state law borrowing, however. First, federal courts are not required to
borrow state law where that law discriminates against federal rights by applying
different limitations periods to similar state and federal causes of action.74 Second,
"statutes of limitations must give a party a reasonable time to sue. 75
The Rules of Decision Act is not a compelling justification for borrowing state
limitations periods. According to the Act, state laws must be used "in cases where
they apply,",76 but state law does not apply to causes of action created by federal
statutes. Later courts recognized that difficulty and therefore rejected the Rules of
Decision Act as a justification for borrowing state limitations periods.77 Today,
federal courts borrow state limitations periods "as a matter of interstitial fashioning
of remedial details under the respective substantive federal statutes. 78 Thus,
79
limitations borrowing is an example of courts making federal common law.
Courts find that they are justified in continuing to adopt state limitations periods
because Congress has acquiesced in the limitations periods that the courts have
imposed on some federal causes of action.80
Although borrowing from state law is the traditional solution for filling in
limitations periods, courts should not borrow from state law where the analogous
state limitations periods would frustrate the "purpose or operation" of the federal
law. 81 In DelCostello, for example, the Supreme Court refused to apply a
limitations period from state law to suits brought under the Labor Management
Relations Act because all analogous state limitations periods were either too brief
to vindicate the rights of employees or too long to promote the rapid resolution of
disputes. 82 Instead, the Court adopted the National Labor Relation Act's six-month

70. The result of that exercise can be found in Wagner v. Logansport Community
School Corp., 990 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (adopting Indiana's thirty-day limitation
period for appeals from administrative agency decisions).
71. Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
72. The Rules of Decision Act was originally enacted as § 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789. Now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000), the Act provides: "[t]he laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
73. Campbell, 155 U.S. at 615-16.
74. Id. at 615.
75. Id.

76. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
77. Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1946); see also DelCostello v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 160 n.13 (1983) (stating that "[s]ince Erie, no decision of
this Court has held or suggested that the Act requires borrowing state law to fill gaps in
federal substantive statutes").
78. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 160 n.13.
79. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 7.07 (3d ed. 2002); Mikva & Pfander, supra note 60, at 396.
80. See N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995).
81. Id.
82. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 168.
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limitations period for making charges of unfair labor practices.8 3
Although in DelCostello and other cases84 courts have borrowed limitations
periods from federal statutes, the Supreme Court recently stated that federal
borrowing is the exception and not the rule for filling in statutes of limitations.85 In
North Star Steel Co. the Court stated:

But the reference to federal law is the exception, and we decline to
follow a state limitations period "only 'when a rule from elsewhere in
federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state
statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of
litigation make that rule86 a significantly more appropriate vehicle for
interstitial lawmaking."'
Thus, when determining a proper limitations period for a federal cause of
action, courts should first locate all analogous state causes of action. Courts should
then determine which state cause of action is most analogous to the federal cause of
action. If the limitations period for that state cause of action is consistent with the
purposes and operation of the federal law, then that limitations period should apply.
If the limitations period is inconsistent with the purposes and operation of the
federal law, then courts must determine whether there are any analogous state
causes of action whose limitations periods are consistent. If so, then that limitations
period should apply. 7 Only if there is no analogous state cause of action that has a
limitations period consistent with the federal law should a court borrow a
limitations period from federal law.
III. LIMrrATIONS PERIODS ADOPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW ACTIONS
Although a complete analysis of the appropriate

limitations period for

administrative review actions is beyond the scope of this Note, 88 a brief overview
of the subject is necessary to understand the debate over what limitations period
should apply to attorneys' fees actions. The judicial circuits are almost evenly split
between those that favor a shorter limitations period for administrative review
actions and those that favor a longer period.8 9 The First, Second, Seventh, Ninth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits favor shorter limitations periods, ranging from thirty
days to four months. 90 In contrast, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth

83. Id. at 169.
84. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipking, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
359 (1991); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
85. N. Star Steel Co., 515 U.S. at 35.
86. Id. (quoting Reed v. Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 324 (1989) (quoting DelCostello,
462 U.S. at 172)).
87. Although the Supreme Court does not explicitly state that all analogous state causes
of action must be examined before a court may apply a federal limitations period, the
reference in North Star Steel Co. to "available state statutes" implies that courts should look
at all possible state causes of action.
88. For a thorough discussion and analysis, see Drew G. Peel, Comment, Time to
Learn: Borrowing a Limitations Periodfor Actions Arising Under Section 1415(e)(2) of the
Educationfor All HandicappedChildrenAct of 1975, 1991 U. CHu. LEGAL F. 315.
89. See infra notes 90-91.

90. Cory D. v. Burke County Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1295 (1lth Cir. 2002) (thirty
days); Providence Sch. Dep't v. Ana C., 108 F.3d 1, 5 (lst Cir. 1997) (thirty days);
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Circuits favor longer limitations periods, ranging from one to six years. 91 Although
there is no appellate court opinion in92the Tenth Circuit, a district court in Utah
adopted a thirty-day limitations period.
All of the courts that favor a brief limitations period find that administrative
review actions are most analogous to state actions that authorize appeals from
administrative agency decisions.93 Those state statutes usually have brief
limitations periods. 94 Of the courts that favor longer limitations periods, some find
that administrative review actions are most analogous to actions for personal
injury.95 Other courts find that there is no closely analogous state cause of action
and therefore apply the state's residual statute of limitations.96 Still other courts
find that administrative review actions are most analogous to appeals from
administrative agency decisions but refuse to apply the brief limitations periods
permitted by those statutes because the courts find brief limitations periods
inconsistent with the purposes of the IDEA.97
On the whole, the language, structure, and legislative history of the IDEA all
favor adopting the brief limitations periods governing administrative appeals.
Although § 1415(i)(2)(A) states that parents or schools have the right to bring a
"civil action" rather than an "appeal,"° the civil action provides for judicial review
of administrative proceedings. Although courts are permitted to hear evidence not
introduced at the administrative hearings' °° and are directed to base their decision
"on the preponderance of the evidence,"'' 1 the Supreme Court has held that those
provisions are "by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they
review." 10 2 Further, the Court stated that reviewing courts must give "due weight"
to administrative proceedings. 0 3 Thus, the scope of review in civil actions
authorized by § 1415(i)(2)(A) is similar to the scope of review for an appeal of an
administrative agency decision.l°4
It is clear from the legislative history of the IDEA that a brief limitations
period is consistent with the purposes of the statute. One of the sponsors of the

Livingston Sch. Dist. Nos. 4 & 1 v. Keenan, 82 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1996) (thirty days);
Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 1994) (120 days); Spiegler v,District of
Columbia, 866 F.2d 461, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (thirty days); Adler v. Educ. Dep't, 760 F.2d
454, 459-60 (2d Cir. 1985) (four months).
91. Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850, 856 (8th Cir. 2000) (three years);
Schimel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 480 (4th Cir. 1987) (one year); Janzen v. Knox County
Bd.of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 1986) (three years); Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d
432, 438 (5th Cir. 1984) (two years); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665 F.2d 443, 454
(3d Cir. 1981) (two or six years).
92. L.C. v. Utah State Bd.of Educ., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1218 (D. Utah 1999).
93. See supra note 90.

94. Peel, supra note 88, at 329.
95. Birmingham, 220 F.3d at 856.
96. Schimel, 819 F.2d at 480.
97. Scokin v. Texas, 723 F. 2d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1984).

98. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2000).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(ii).
101. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii).
102. Bd.of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).

103. Id.
104. Peel, supra note 88, at 328-29.
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EAHCA, the predecessor to the IDEA, stated, "in view of the urgent need for
prompt resolution of questions involving the education of handicapped children it
is expected that all hearings and reviews conducted pursuant to these provisions
will be commenced and disposed of 10as5 quickly as practicable consistent with fair
consideration of the issues involved."'
Further, other provisions of the IDEA make a long limitations period
unnecessary.' 6 The IDEA requires that a student's IEP be reviewed at least once
per year. 10 7 Therefore, even if a parent aggrieved by a school's decision does not
receive relief at the administrative level and does not timely file for judicial review,
the parent can still challenge the school's action at the next IEP conference. After
that IEP conference, the full range of administrative and judicial remedies is again
available to the parent.'°0
IV. THE

APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS PERIOD FOR ATrORNEYS' FEES ACTIONS

Although the judicial circuits disagree about the proper limitations period for
administrative review actions, the approach each circuit follows is settled. °9 In
contrast, there is much uncertainty, even within each circuit, concerning the proper
limitations period for attorneys' fees actions. As noted in the Introduction, the only
federal courts of appeals to address this issue are the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits."10 Further, there are many states in which no court has considered the
question of limitations periods for attorneys' fees actions.11 '
Several factors may explain why there are fewer attorneys' fees cases than
administrative review cases. First, there are fewer potential plaintiffs in attorneys'
fees actions. Both schools and parents can seek judicial review of agency
decisions,11 2 but only parents may bring an action for attorneys' fees."l 3 Second, the
right of parents to obtain attorneys' fees has existed only since Congress enacted
the HCPA in 1986.114 Third, and perhaps most important, attorneys have a strong
incentive to seek attorneys' fees quickly regardless of what limitations period
exists. 115

105. 121 CONG. Rnc. 37,416 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams's
statement is one of the most often cited justifications for applying a brief limitations period
to § 1415(i)(2)(A) actions. See Cory D. v. Burke County Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1299
(11th Cir. 2002); Livingston Sch. Dist. Nos. 4 & 1 v. Keenan, 82 F.3d 912, 916-17 (9th Cir.
1996); Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1060 (7th Cir. 1994); Spiegler v. District of
Columbia, 866 F.2d 461, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Adler v. Educ. Dep't, 760 F.2d 454, 460 (2d
Cir. 1985); Peel, supra note 88, at 319.
106. See Peel, supra note 88, at 330.
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i) (2000).
108. See Adler, 760 F.2d at 460; Peel, supra note 88, at 330.
109. The Tenth Circuit is the exception. See supra text accompanying note 92.
110. See supra note 10.
111. For a summary of the cases considering limitations periods, see STUDENTS WITH
DIsABtLrrms AND SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 173-76, supra note 8.
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) creates a right of action for "[any party aggrieved by
the findings and decision" of the state education agency.
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) ("In any action or proceeding brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs
to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." (emphasis added)).
114. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986).
115. See Zipperer v,Sch. Bd., 111 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Besides the paucity of reported cases, another source of uncertainty for
litigants in attorneys' fees cases is that some courts adopt different limitations
periods for attorneys' fees actions than for administrative review actions. In fact, of
the three judicial circuits to consider limitations periods both for attorneys' fees and
for administrative review actions, only the Seventh Circuit has adopted the same
limitations period for both." 6 The Sixth Circuit has adopted a three-year limitations
period for administrative review actions,'" 7 but a thirty-day limitations period for
attorneys' fees actions. 1' 8 The Eleventh Circuit followed the opposite course and
adopted a thirty-day limitations period for administrative review actions"19 but a
four-year limitations period for attorneys' fees actions. 120 For the reasons discussed
below, courts should follow the lead of the Eleventh Circuit and adopt longer
limitations periods for attorneys' fees actions than for administrative review
actions.
A. An Independent Cause of Action for Attorneys' Fees
The most important disagreement between courts that favor brief limitations
periods and courts that favor longer limitations periods concerns whether attorneys'
fees actions are independent or ancillary to administrative review actions. Courts
that adopt brief limitations periods hold that actions for attorneys' fees are part of
the judicial review of administrative decisions. 121 In contrast, courts favoring
longer limitations periods characterize actions for attorneys' fees as independent
actions. 122 The Seventh Circuit has neatly summarized the divide:
If seen as an independent cause of action, a claim for attorneys' fees
under § 1415 is arguably analogous to a tort action seeking money
damages, which usually carries a comparatively long statute of
limitations.... If viewed as part of the administrative review of the
underlying education dispute, however, the claim is more analogous to
statutes dealing with judicial review of state agency decisions.12 3 The
limitations period for such agency review is generally quite short.
1. Arguments That Attorneys' Fees Actions Are Ancillary to Administrative
Review Actions
Both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have concluded that a claim for attorneys'
fees is part of the administrative review process. 124 The Seventh Circuit holds that

116. Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir. 1994).
117. Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 1986).
118. King v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 228 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2000).
119. Cory D. v. Burke County Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11 th Cir. 2002).
120. Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 852.
121. See, e.g., King, 228 F.3d at 626; Powers v. Ind. Dep't of Educ., 61 F.3d 552, 556
(7th Cir. 1995).
122. See, e.g., Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851; Shanahan v. Bd. of Educ., 953 F. Supp. 440,
443 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
123. Powers, 61 F.3d at 555 (citations omitted).
124. King, 228 F.3d at 626; Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1064 (7th Cir. 1994).
At least one district court from the Fourth Circuit has agreed with the view that actions for
attorneys' fees are part of administrative review. See Mayo v. Booker, 56 F. Supp. 2d 597,
598 (D. Md. 1999).
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§ 1415(i)(2)(A) is the only part of § 1415 that confers a right to judicial review.125
The court stated in McCartney C. that parents who prevail against a school in an
administrative hearing may "bring an independent suit in federal court under 20
U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) [now codified at § 1415(i)(2)] to obtain, pursuant to
§ 1415(e)(4)(B) [now codified at § 1415(i)(3)(B)], reimbursement of the attorney's
fees expended ....
126 According to the Seventh Circuit, then, § 1415(i)(3)(B)
does not create a cause of action separate from § 1415(i)(2)(A). Therefore, the
statute of limitations that 2applies to administrative review actions must also apply
to attorneys' fees actions.' 7
The Sixth Circuit also held that attorneys' fees actions are part of the judicial
review of administrative proceedings. 128 The court stated in King:
[T]he 1986 fee award amendment to the IDEA had the effect of making
a parent who prevailed in the administrative proceedings with the
assistance of counsel an "aggrieved" party, for purposes of 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(2), insofar as there was no award of attorney fees. As an
aggrieved party, the parent is authorized to go to court to seek
reasonable attorney fees. 129
On the Sixth Circuit's view, parents can obtain attorneys' fees only because
they are "aggrieved parties" for purposes of § 1415(i)(2)(A). Since the court holds
that the IDEA "seems to treat the award of attorney fees as another phase of the
administrative proceeding,"' 30 § 1415(i)(2)(A) provides both relief from
administrative decisions and awards for attorneys' fees. Therefore, the same statute
of limitations must apply to both types of proceedings.
2. Arguments That Attorneys' Fees Actions Are Independent Actions
The arguments advanced by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits are not compelling
because § 1415(i)(3)(B) creates a cause of action not only where parents prevail in

125. See McCartney C. v. Herrin Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 21 F.3d 173, 174 (7th
Cir. 1994). In McCartney C. the court did not address the issue of how long the limitations
period should be, but rather when the limitations period began to run. The parents of a
disabled child had prevailed against the school district in a hearing before the state education
agency, and the school did not seek judicial review of the agency's decision. When the
parents brought an action in federal court to recover the attorneys' fees they incurred during
the administrative proceedings, the school district argued that their action was time barred
because the parents had not filed their claim within 120 days of the state education agency's
decision. The parents did not dispute that the proper limitations period was 120 days, but
they argued that the limitations period did not begin to run until 120 days after the state
agency's decision. Only then, the parents argued, had they prevailed, because that was the
point at which the school district could no longer seek judicial review of the agency's
decision. The Seventh Circuit agreed with the parents. Thus, where all education and
placement issues are resolved at the administrative level, a claim for attorneys' fees does not
accrue until the time when the losing party may appeal has elapsed. Id. at 175.
126. Id. at 174 (emphases added).
127. See Dell, 32 F.3d at 1061 (stating that "[ajlthough Congress might have intended
to 'unbundle' the placement and reimbursement issues, it did not do so").
128. King, 228 F.3d at 626.
129. Id. at 625.
130. Id.
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3
a judicial review, but also where parents prevail in administrative hearings' 1 or
132
fees
attorneys'
Although § 1415(i)(3)(B) authorizes an award of
negotiations.
133
not
have
courts
section,"'
this
under
brought
proceeding
"[iun any action or
court. 34
limited recovery of attorneys' fees to situations where parents prevail in
Since parents may bring attorneys' fees actions even where they do not bring an
action under § 1415(i)(2)(A), there is no support for the position of the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits that attorneys' fees actions are brought under § 1415(i)(2)(A).
Further, there are many differences between administrative review actions and
attorneys' fees actions. First, the parties who are authorized to bring administrative
review actions are different from the parties who are authorized to bring attorneys'
fees actions. 135 Under § 1415(i)(2)(A), "[any party aggrieved by the findings and
decision" of the state education agency may bring a civil action in state or federal
court. 136 Thus, both parents and schools may seek judicial review of the state
permits only parents, not
agency's decision. 37 Section 1415(i)(3)(B), however,
38
schools, to bring an action for attorneys' fees. 1
Second, appeals from state education agency decisions and actions for
attorneys' fees differ in their scope of review. In administrative review actions,
courts must show substantial deference to the determinations of the administrative
agency.139 By contrast, administrative agencies do not have authority to award
attorneys' fees under the IDEA. 14 0 Thus, there can be no deference to the findings
for attorneys' fees, because "[n]o aspect of
of an administrative agency in an action
141
[that] action is appellate in nature."'
Third, the facts and legal bases upon which courts make attorneys' fees
decisions are different from the facts and legal bases upon which courts review
state education agency decisions. 42 Although a reviewing court in an
administrative review action must show deference to the findings of the state
education agency, the court's review "is also intended to be a revisiting of the
merits of the underlying litigation."' 143 By contrast, the only questions in an
attorneys' fees action are "who won?" and "what is a reasonable fee?". 44The court
win.
does not need to determine who should have won, but only who did

131. Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Duane M. v.
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 861 F.2d 115, 120 (5th Cir. 1988); Eggers v. Bullitt County Sch.
Dist., 854 F.2d 892, 898 (6th Cir. 1988).
132. Shelly C. v. Venus Indep. Sch. Dist., 878 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 1989).
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000).
134. See supra notes 131-32.
135. See Zipperer v. Sch. Bd., 111 F.3d 847, 851 n.2 (lth Cir. 1997).
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
137. Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851 n.2.
138. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851 n.2; see also Curtis K. v.
Sioux City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1197, 1210 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (noting that
§ 1415(i)(3)(B) "provides for a cause of action for attorney fees, not by 'any aggrieved
party,' but by a 'prevailing party"').
139. Bd.of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
140. Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851.
141. Bow Sch. Dist. v. Quentin W., 750 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.N.H. 1990); see also
Curtis K., 895 F. Supp. at 1211 (stating that "[there is no suggestion of deference to any
prior decision in a fee-claim action").
142. B.K. v. Toms River Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462,470 (D.N.J. 1998).
143. CurtisK., 895 F. Supp. at 1209.
144. Id.
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Finally, some courts hold that there is a jurisdictional difference between
§§ 1415(i)(2)(A) and 1415(i)(3)(B). 145 According to those courts, state and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative review actions, but federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over attorneys' fees actions.146 It is clear from the

plain language of the statute that an administrative review action may be brought in
either state or federal court. 147 Section 1415(i)(2)(A) provides that an aggrieved
party may bring a civil action "in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in' 4a8
district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy." 1
It is not clear, however, that an action for attorneys' fees can be brought only in
federal court, and one49state court has held that state courts have jurisdiction to
award attorneys' fees. 1

The jurisdiction controversy centers on the provision that immediately
precedes the attorneys' fees provision. Section 1415(i)(3)(A) provides: "[t]he
district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under
this section without regard to the amount in controversy."' 50 While some courts
hold that this provision deprives state courts of jurisdiction,'15 the court in J.H.R.
held that the language merely extends jurisdiction to federal courts without taking it
away from state courts. 152 The court reasoned that § 1415(i)(3)(A) was a part of the
IDEA before it provided for attorneys' fees.153 That section was added only to
remove any limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts based on the amount in
controversy and therefore does not take away jurisdiction from state courts.' 54 The
historical argument in J.H.R. is strengthened by the practical argument that it
would be a waste of judicial resources to permit parents to file for judicial review
of educational decisions in state court but then require them to file for attorneys'
fees in federal court.1 55
B. The Relevance of FederalRule of Civil Procedure54
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[u]nless otherwise
provided by statute or order of the court, the motion [for attorneys' fees] must be
filed no later than 14 days after entry of judgment."' 156 Courts are divided over
whether Rule 54 provides a limitations period for some IDEA attorneys' fees
actions.15 7 It is clear that Rule 54 does not apply to actions to recover attorneys'
fees incurred where the merits of the case were resolved during negotiations or at

145. Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851; Curtis K., 895 F. Supp. at 1210.
146. Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851; Curtis K., 895 F. Supp. at 1210.
147. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2000).
148. Id.

149. J.H.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 705 A.2d 766, 773-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
150. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A).
151. Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851; Curtis K., 895 F. Supp. at 1210.
152. J.H.R., 705 A.2d at 776.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B).
157. Compare Day v. Radnor Township Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.92-3764, 1994 WL
683375, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 1994) (holding that Rule 54 applies), with J.B. v. EssexCaledonia Supervisory Union, 943 F. Supp. 387, 390 (D. Vt. 1996) (holding that Rule 54
does not apply).
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the administrative level.' 58 Rule 54 limits how long a prevailing party has to move
for fees after entry of a judgment. 159 Where parents and schools resolve their
disputes through negotiation, there is no judgment entered. Further, since an order
of a state education agency is not a judgment within the meaning of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54 does not 0apply to actions to recover attorneys'
fees incurred in administrative proceedings.16
Even where parents prevail at the level of judicial review, however, some
courts still hold that Rule 54 does not apply. The court in J.B. reasoned as follows:
"[U]nder Rule 54, the request for fees is presumed to be initiated by motion. The
IDEA requires that all actions for attorneys' fees and costs be determined by
actions in the district courts. Actions
' 61 for legal fees cannot be initiated by motion.
Rule 54 is therefore, inapplicable."'
Although several courts have held that Rule 54 does apply to IDEA attorneys'
fees actions where a district court has entered a judgment on the merits,

62

the

reasoning in J.B. is persuasive because § 1415(i)(3)(B) creates an independent
cause of action for attorneys' fees. 163 Rule 54 "presupposes . . . that a postjudgment request for fees and costs is ancillary to that judgment and not a separate
cause of action."' 64 Thus, Rule 54 does not apply to attorneys' fees actions brought
under the IDEA because § 1415(i)(3)(B) creates a separate cause of action for
attorneys' fees.
C. Consistency with Purposes and Operation of the IDEA
Courts that favor brief limitations periods and courts that favor longer
limitations periods both hold that their preferred limitations period is consistent
with the purposes and operation of the IDEA. This Part reviews the arguments of
both camps and concludes that because longer limitations periods are consistent
with the purposes and operation of the IDEA, limitations periods for actions
founded on statutory liability should apply to attorneys' fees actions.
1. Arguments That Brief Limitations Periods Are Consistent with the IDEA
Courts that have found the IDEA's attorneys' fees provision analogous to
administrative appeals have also concluded that a brief limitations period is
consistent with the purposes and operation of the IDEA. The Seventh Circuit
stressed that delaying the adjudication of attorneys' fees could not serve a useful

158. Ivanlee J., Jr. v. Wilson Area Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.97-683, 1997 WL 164272, at
*1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. April 3, 1997) ("Of course, because no final judgment has been rendered in
this action, Rule 54 does not apply." (emphasis in original)); J.B., 943 F. Supp. at 390
("[Rule 54] presupposes that a final judgment is entered by a court and that a post-judgment
request for fees and costs is ancillary to that judgment and not a separate cause of action.").
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B).
160. J.B., 943 F. Supp. at 390; see also King v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 228 F.3d
622, 627 (6th Cir. 2000); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A.91-2818 (JEI), 1995 WL

428635, at *2 (D.N.J. July 17, 1995).
161. J.B., 943 F. Supp. at 390 (citations omitted).
162. See King, 228 F.3d at 627; Oberti, 1995 WL 428635, at *2; Day, 1994 WL
683375, at *1.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
164. J.B., 943 F. Supp. at 390.
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purpose, because by the time a cause of action for attorneys' fees accrues, all
parties should know the extent of the legal fees they have incurred.1 65 While the
court in Dell conceded that the need to resolve attorneys' fees disputes was less
pressing than the need to resolve educational issues, the court nevertheless asserted
that allparties to the litigation have an interest in the prompt resolution of all the
issues.
One court has stated that delaying resolution of attorneys' fees issues may
actually harm some schools. 167 In Oberti, parents had prevailed against a school
district in a judicial review of the state education agency's placement decision for
their son. 68 More than two years after the district court entered judgment in favor
of the parents, they brought suit seeking attorneys' fees. 1 69 The court in which the
claim for attorneys' fees was filed found that the claim was untimely. 170 One of the
reasons the court cited for finding that the claim was time barred was that "[i]n a
climate of increasing demands on shrinking public education resources, we are not
prepared to resuscitate the forgotten obligations
of prior years and impose them on
71
the school district's current budget."1
Parents who delay in bringing actions for attorneys' fees may burden courts as
well as schools. Since the IDEA authorizes courts to award "reasonable attorneys'
fees" to a parent who is a "prevailing party," 172 courts must determine whether
parents prevailed and whether the amount of attorneys' fees they requested is
reasonable. Making those determinations often requires courts to review the
records of the administrative proceedings and the judicial proceedings, if there are
any records. 173 It may be more difficult to determine who prevailed and whether the
amount of attorneys' fees expended
was reasonable if a long time has elapsed since
17 4
the proceedings on the merits.
While delaying the adjudication of attorneys' fees may cause hardships for
both schools and courts, it is less clear that forcing parents to bring their claims
promptly will harm parents. In the context of placement decisions, some courts
have decided not to adopt brief limitations periods because they believed that a
brief period would prejudice the rights of parents who were not represented by
attorneys and who might not be familiar with the legal system. Parents who sue
for attorneys' fees, however, are represented, or have been represented, by an
attorney. Therefore, courts that adopt brief limitations periods for attorneys' fees

165. Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1063-64 (7th Cir. 1994).
166. Id. at 1063.
167. Oberti, 1995 WL 428635, at *4.
168. Id. at *1.
169. Id.
170. Id. at *4.
171. Id.
172. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000).
173. Mayo v. Booker, 56 F. Supp. 2d 597, 598 (D. Md. 1999).
174. Id.; see also Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 32 F.3d 1053, 1063 (7th Cir. 1994) (arguing that
because an award of attorneys' fees requires a court to review an administrative record that it
did not create, delaying the adjudication of attorneys' fees wastes judicial resources).
175. See, e.g., Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d 477, 482 (4th Cir. 1987). Some courts
seek to protect parents by requiring the school district to provide information about
applicable statutes of limitations to parents and tolling the statute of limitations if schools
fail to provide that information. See, e.g., Spiegler v. District of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461,
469 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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176
actions "do not run the risk of hurting vulnerable unrepresented parents."'
Another concern about brief limitations periods in the context of appeals of
educational decisions is that brief limitations periods will force parents to seek out
an attorney and thereby become less involved in their children's
education. 177 That
78
fees.'
attorneys'
for
suits
in
concern is, of course, irrelevant

2. Arguments That Longer Limitations Periods Are Consistent with the IDEA
The longer limitations periods provided for actions founded on statutory
liability are consistent with the purposes and operation of the IDEA. While the
Eleventh Circuit found that the goals of the IDEA could not be achieved unless
educational disputes were resolved quickly, 179 it also found that "the resolution of
claims for attorneys' fees is less urgent."80 Several district courts have also held
that a longer
limitations period for attorneys' fees actions will not disserve the
81
IDEA.'

Those same courts also found that longer limitations periods will positively
promote the goals of the IDEA. Longer limitations periods may encourage parents
to vindicate the rights guaranteed to their children by the IDEA. 82 By vindicating
the rights3 of their own children, parents advance the rights of all disabled
children.1

The principal virtue of a longer limitations period is that it encourages
settlement of attorneys' fees claims. 184 Courts are concerned that brief limitations
periods will force parents into litigation because parents will not have enough time
to negotiate for fees before the limitations period expires. 185 That concern was
stated most forcefully in Curtis K:
[T]he 30-day statute of limitations suggested by defendants provides no
realistic opportunity for the negotiation and compromise of fee claims
prior to the filing of an independent action for fees in federal court ....

176. Powers v. Ind. Dep't of Educ., 61 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 1995).
177. See Janzen v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 484, 487 (6th Cir. 1986);
Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1984); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills Sch. Dist., 665
F.2d 443, 452 (3d Cir. 1981). For a critique of the argument that brief limitations periods
discourage parental involvement in education, see Peel, supra note 88, at 332.
178. Powers, 61 F.3d at 558.
179. Cory D. v. Burke County Sch. Dist., 285 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002).
180. Zipperer v. Sch. Bd., 111 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir. 1997).
181. B.K. v. Toms River Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462, 471 (D.N.J. 1998); Curtis K v.
Sioux City Cmty. Sch., 895 F. Supp. 1197, 1219 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Michael M. v. Bd. of
Educ., 686 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
182. See Zipperer, 111 F.3d at 851-52; see also B.K, 998 F. Supp. at 473. In B.K. the
parents' attorney failed to seek attorneys' fees despite the parents' requests that he do so.
The parents were therefore obliged to hire a second attorney to pursue the attorneys' fees
claim. The court stated, "In this context, preventing plaintiff from seeking reimbursement for
counsel fees paid to her former attorney would only serve to discourage parents from
advocating the rights of their children." Id.
183. See CurtisK., 895 F. Supp. at 1219.
184. B.K., 998 F. Supp. at 471 ("[Alllowing a longer statute of limitations for fee
claims would allow enough time for the parties to attempt to agree on the issue of attorneys'
fees.").
185. CurtisK., 895 F. Supp. at 1219-20.
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the court does not see how good faith negotiations can be carried on
among the parties, some of whom are directed by boards, and some of
whom may have to apportion a fee claim between them, within so short
a time... The court desires that all such negotiations be conducted in
good faith, and not with an eye to making a short fee-claim statute of
limitations a trap for the unwary. 186
Promoting settlement is especially important where the merits of the placement
issues were resolved at an administrative hearing or in negotiations prior87 to a
hearing, because there is no need for any judicial involvement in those cases.'
D. Actions Founded on Statutory Liability: The Best Limitations Period
In the absence of congressional action, the most appropriate limitations periods
are those contained in general statutes of limitations that govern "action[s] founded
on statutory liability."' 88 Those statutes are more analogous to § 1415(i)(3)(B) than
statutes providing for judicial review of administrative decisions, because an action
for attorneys' fees is not a review or appeal, but rather an independent cause of
action.' 8 9 Longer limitations periods will not frustrate the purposes or operation of
the IDEA. On the contrary, longer limitations periods will promote voluntary
settlement of attorneys' fees claims between parents and schools, thereby reducing
litigation and allowing schools to use more resources for education. 90 Parents and
their attorneys will not rush to file suits to beat a brief limitations period, and
schools will be motivated to resolve attorneys' fees issues promptly to avoid future
litigation. Although some have argued that it is unfair to burden future years'
school boards and administrators with past years' legal expenses,' 91 the liability for
attorneys' fees is created by the IDEA, and schools can avoid future liability by
settling fee disputes promptly.
The argument that long limitations periods will burden courts 192 also has little
merit. For proceedings resolved during negotiations or at an administrative hearing,
the court awarding attorneys' fees will be unfamiliar with the case no matter how
promptly or tardily parents bring a fee action. The mere passage of time does not
make an administrative record or lawyer's time sheets more difficult to understand.
For cases resolved upon judicial review, however, there would be a gain in judicial
efficiency if fee disputes were resolved in the same proceeding with the educational
issues involved in the case.

186. Id.
187. See King v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 228 F.3d 622, 628 (6th Cir. 2000) (Engel,
J., dissenting).
188. FLA. STAT. ch. 95.11(3)(f) (2002). The Eleventh Circuit adopted that statute of
limitations in Zipperer v. School Board, 111 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir. 1997). A district court
in New York adopted a similar New York statute in Michael M. v. Board of Education, 686
F. Supp. 995, 1002 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). The New York statute imposed a three year limitations
period on "an action to recover a liability.., created or imposed by statute." Id.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
190. See B.K. v. Toms River Bd.of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462,471 (D.N.J. 1998); Curtis
K., 895 F. Supp. at 1219-20.
191. Oberti v. Bd.of Educ., No. CIV.A.91-2818 (JEI), 1995 WL 428635, at *4 (D.N.J.
July 17, 1995).
192. See Dell v. Bd. of Educ., 113, 32 F.3d 1053, 1063 (7th Cir. 1994); Mayo v.
Booker, 56 F. Supp. 2d 597, 598 (D. Md. 1999).
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Even in those cases, the gain in efficiency is not great. The only questions a
court must answer in an attorneys' fees action are whether the parents prevailed
and whether the fees for the attorney's services were reasonable. 93 Whether the
parents prevailed will usually be apparent from the order issued by the court. The
court will either order the school to comply with some of the important requests
made by the parents or it will deny the parents' requests. Parents do not have to
obtain all the relief they requested to be considered prevailing parties. They need
only "succeed on any significant issue which achieves some of the benefit [they]
sought."1 94
The question of what is a reasonable fee is composed of two parts. First, a
court must determine the prevailing rate in the community for services of the type
and quality the lawyer performed.' 95 Second, the court must determine whether the
amount of time the lawyer worked on the case was reasonable.196 Only the second
part requires reviewing the record of the case, since the prevailing legal rates in the
community do not depend upon the facts of a particular case. Even the question of
whether the parents and their lawyer devoted a reasonable amount of time to the
case does not require a searching review of the merits of the case. 197 Thus, little
efficiency is gained by dealing with attorneys' fees and educational issues in a
single proceeding.
CONCLUSION

The best possible solution to the problem of limitations periods for attorneys'
fees actions is for Congress to amend the IDEA to provide a limitations period.
Congressional action would resolve uncertainty and relieve the courts of litigation
that distracts them from enforcing the substantive provisions of the IDEA.
Congress also is in a better position than the courts to establish a fair limitations
period. Congress is not bound by the jurisprudence of state law borrowing, and
Congress can conduct investigations to determine an appropriate limitations period.
Given Congress's long silence on limitations periods in the IDEA and other federal
statutes, however, it is unlikely that a congressional solution will be forthcoming.
The structure and goals of the IDEA support adopting a longer limitations
period for attorneys' fees actions. Although the four-year period adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit may be longer than necessary to safeguard the rights of disabled
children and their parents, the state law borrowing doctrine confines courts' choices
of limitations periods. 198 Section 1415(i)(3)(B) creates a statutory liability. Courts
should, therefore, borrow the limitations period from state law that governs actions
for liability created by statute. Although the lengthy limitations periods may create

193. 20 U.S.C. at § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2000).
194. Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789 (1989).
See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
195. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C).
196. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F)(iii).
197. See Curtis K. v. Sioux City Cmty. Sch., 895 F. Supp. 1197, 1209 (stating that "an
action for attorney fees 'should not result in a second major litigation' revisiting the merits
of the underlying action" (quoting Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990))).
198. In the context of borrowing a limitations period for administrative review actions,
the D.C. Circuit described itself as "faced with the unenviable task of choosing between a
30-day limitations period and a 3-year limitations period." Spiegler v. District of Columbia,
866 F.2d 461, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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some difficulties for courts and schools, the difficulties are not so great as to make
the limitations periods inconsistent with the purposes and operation of the IDEA,
especially since the purpose of the attorneys' fees provision is to ensure that
parents are able to vindicate their children's rights. Until Congress acts to fill the
statutory void, courts should follow the course of the Eleventh Circuit.

